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Foreword
The national goals of clean air1 and clean water 2 were put
into law more than a decade ago. Since then, the commitment
to implement environmental laws has been diverted by differ-
ent and apparently more urgent economic priorities. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the principal
agency charged with enforcing these laws, argues that too
often regulations mandate costly expenditures for marginal
results-a luxury our cost-conscious nation can ill afford.
Imbued with the present Administration's philosophy of
returning regulatory responsibility to the states, the EPA has
turned its attention to the Clean Water Act,3 which is sched-
uled for reauthorization in 1983. 4 The Agency is in the process
of writing new rules that would give the states the flexibility
to set water quality standards tailored to local needs.5 The
wisdom of this approach will depend on whether each state
has the ability to maintain or improve upon the Act's goals of
"fishable" and "swimmable" waters,6 because the states will
have to assume a greater share of the regulatory burden.
Despite these changes in our national priorities, it is clear
that the American people remain committed to the ideals of
environmental protection.7
1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
3. Id.
4. EPA's Draft Amendments to the Clean Water Act, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2057-
60 (Mar. 11, 1983).
5. Proposed Rule, Water Quality Standards Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,234
(Oct. 29, 1982).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
7. In November 1982, the results of a poll sponsored by a corporation with
interests in packaging, forest products, and energy production were released. The poll
surveyed members of the general public, environmentalists, and representatives of
large and small businesses. The results showed that 60% of the public, 59% of large
companies, and 51% of small companies favored increases in the costs of services and
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Given Congress's current concern with the Clean Water
Act, it is appropriate in this inaugural issue of the Pace
Environmental Law Review to concentrate on recent develop-
ments in water law. Several of the Notes and Comments
which follow, while focused on New York, suggest the varied
scope of water law, the complex interests encountered when
implementing the law at the local level, and the pressures
mounting to postpone timetables and relax attainment stan-
dards.
The issue opens with an equally timely topic. Carol E.
Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, outlines the Justice
Department's negotiation and litigation strategy to ensure
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, pursuant to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act 8 and Superfund.9 It is encour-
aging to learn, at a time when public attention is focused on
this long-ignored danger, that cleanup of these sites will
benefit from the Department's vigorous civil and criminal
enforcement efforts.
Professor Donald W. Stever, Jr., surveys the confusing
area of law that has evolved under the attorneys' fee provi-
sions of environmental statutes, an issue that is awaiting
decision by the Supreme Court.10 Professor Stever suggests
that Congress may have created a statutory standard for fee
awards that is intentionally vague so that the courts would be
free to create a rule in common law fashion. He proposes that
the rules which have evolved under these provisions, princi-
products to reductions in environmental cleanup. Fifty-five percent of the general
public favored maintaining current air pollution standards "'even if some factories
close as a result.'" Research and Forecasts, Inc., Toward Responsible Growth,
sponsored by the Continental Group. 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1053-54 (Nov. 19, 1982).
The results of this poll are consistent with the New York Times/CBS News Polls
conducted in January and September 1981 (N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1981, at Al, col. 3;
Oct. 4, 1981, § 1, at 30, col. 3), and a poll conducted by Louis Harris in May and
September 1981 (12 Env't Rep. (BNA) 280-81, 789-90 (Oct. 23, 1981)).
8. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter RCRA], 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
9. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
10. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 254 (1982). After this article went to press, the United States
Supreme Court decided this case under the name of Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 51
U.S.L.W. 5132 (U.S. July 1, 1983).
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pally in the D.C. Circuit, be refined in order to achieve greater
uniformity and to respect more closely the environmental
goals of the statutes.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
proposes in a Committee report that section 5519(a)(1), the
stay of enforcement provision of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules, be amended to conform to the State Environ-
mental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)." Under SEQRA, state
and local agencies are required to consider the impact of their
actions on the environment and to prepare an environmental
impact statement. 12 Agency failure to comply with SEQRA
can result in an order to enjoin a proposed activity which
might damage the environment. Nevertheless, the injunction
can be avoided by the agency because, under section
5519(a)(1), the mere filing of a notice of appeal automatically
stays an order. The agency may then proceed with the activ-
ity, damage the environment, and undermine SEQRA's reme-
dial purpose. The report proposes a return to the pre-1965
language of section 5519(a)(1) so that an agency which ap-
peals an order would be required to present the issues in court
before a stay is granted.
Martin G. Anderson questions the outcome of City of New
York v. EPA,13 in which the City successfully challenged EPA's
refusal to extend the deadline of the City's permit to continue
dumping sewage sludge at a site twelve miles offshore. The
court adopted the City's argument that the dumping was
preferable, for the present, to potentially more hazardous
landfill alternatives. The Note concludes that EPA's choice
not to appeal the decision, as well as the Agency's more
relaxed policy toward ocean-waste disposal, may invite other
municipalities to continue or begin ocean dumping as a solu-
tion to their sewage disposal problems. This would be con-
trary to the policy of the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972.14
11. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
12. Id. at § 8-0109(2).
13. 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). On December 20, 1982, the
1983]
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Millicent Greenberg examines the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis in Milwaukee v. Illinois,15 where the Court held that the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
preempt federal common law of nuisance claims in interstate
water pollution disputes. The Note supports the majority's
holding that when Congress enacts comprehensive legislation
dedicated to a single area of the law, the federal courts are not
free to supplement the statute. It is unclear to what extent
lower federal courts will apply Milwaukee as precedent to
preempt federal common law claims brought under other
environmental statutes.1 6
Lois R. Murphy follows the case history of the Byram
River-the first river to be a plaintiff in a lawsuit'T-through
EPA proposed to redesignate the 12-mile site known as the New York Bight for
continued disposal of sewage sludge. Request for Comments, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,665
(Dec. 20, 1982). The EPA stated that ocean dumping has been permitted "as a direct
result" of City of New York v. EPA and the court-approved settlement, even though
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 [hereinafter MPRSA]
bans ocean dumping after December 31, 1981. 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1442 (Dec. 24,
1982).
On December 22, 1982, a lawsuit was filed in the District Court for the District of
New Jersey against the EPA and six New Jersey sewage authorities to obtain a
phase-out of ocean dumping through environmentally safe land-based alternatives,
dewatering facilities, and pretreatment of industrial wastes. National Wildlife Fed'n
v. Gorsuch, Civ. No. 82-4314 (D.NJ. Dec. 22, 1982) (Complaint). On March 16, 1983,
Rep. Bill Hughes of New Jersey announced that he would introduce an amendment to
MPRSA in order to ban ocean dumping because the EPA" 'refused to implement the
ocean dumping law.'' 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2110-11 (Mar. 25, 1983).
15. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
16. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court extended its holding in Milwaukee to include
federal common law of nuisance claims against ocean dumping brought under the
MPRSA because "[t]he regulatory scheme... is no less comprehensive...." Id. at 22.
See also, United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (the Clean Air
Act preempts federal common law of nuisance claims in a suit alleging air pollution
caused by releases from a hazardous waste site); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (RCRA and Superfund
preempt federal common law of nuisance claims in an action for costs to clean up a
city-owned hazardous waste dump).
17. Since the Byram achieved standing in 1974, this novel device has been used
to bring lawsuits on behalf of a bird and a tree. See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land &
Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 991 (D. Hawaii 1979) (suit brought under the
Endangered Species Act by a bird, among other plaintiffs; the court, however, relied
on the "standing" of other plaintiffs); Ezer v. Fuchsloch, 99 Cal. App.3d 849,853,863-
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the Connecticut i8 and New York 19 courts, and evaluates the
effectiveness of the litigation tool as a way to clean up a local
river polluted by a village sewage treatment plant. Although
the plaintiffs won their case, and although there have been
some improvements in the river, time has not been on their
side. More than twenty years have passed since the first
efforts were made to clean up the Byram. The Note observes
that while laws exist to prohibit pollution of this river, they
have not been enforced.
C. Scott Vanderhoef looks at the current statutory and
common law of New York as it applies to the experience of a
private water purveyor in tapping the Ramapo Aquifer of
Rockland County during a drought. The Comment proposes
that the present statute governing groundwater withdrawals
on Long Island20 be amended to regulate this resource state-
wide.
Steven Chananie compares the "taking" issue in New
York and Connecticut under each state's coastal zone man-
agement program. These programs give the states the power
to regulate and limit the development of privately owned land
situated within their coastal boundaries. Although New York
and Connecticut seem to differ in the way they determine
what is a taking for the purposes of just compensation, the
Comment concludes that the difference is more apparent than
real. Unless there has been a practical confiscation of the
property so that it cannot be put to any reasonable purpose or
any economic use, the developer will not be able to prove that
there has been a taking. Thus, each state will be relatively
free to regulate the development of its coastal lands without
being unduly burdened by the requirement of just compensa-
tion.
The issue closes with a review by Professor Nicholas A.
64, 160 Cal Rptr. 486, 493 (1979) ("defendants were not entitled to a ruling that the
tree in question had an independent 'right' to exist").
18. Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 7 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1127 (D.
Conn. 1974).
19. Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
20. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 15-1527 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1982-1983).
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Robinson of four books which explore different ways of incor-
porating environmental values into the land use decision-
making process. Modern land use has evolved from unfettered
development, to a system of zoning, to the imposition of
environmental land use controls. Two books examine how the
environmental impact assessment process only marginally
promotes the sound use of land. 21 The other two books propose
natural resource planning as a better way to promote ecologi-
cally sound development.22
These Articles, Notes, and Comments illustrate that the
effort to implement environmental policies is not an easy
task. More than likely the polluter will be a municipality, in
the guise of the "people," or an industry, with a loyal constitu-
ency in the community, and the costs of compliance will have
to be borne by taxpayers or passed on to consumers. Too often
the debate over environmental protection is phrased as a
choice between economic growth and preservation of a quality
of life. The challenge to reconcile these two worthy goals has
never been greater. The staff of the Pace Environmental Law
Review enthusiastically joins in this debate and invites your
participation.
Janice Pargh, Class of'83
21. H. Boschken, Land Use Conflicts: Organizational Design and Resource
Management (1982); F. Case & J. Gale, Environmental Impact Review and Housing:
Process Lessons from the California Experience (1982).
22. R. Lemire, Creative Land Development: Bridge to the Future (1979); A.
Palmer, Toward Eden (1981).
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